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Abstract
Frequentist inference typically is described in
terms of hypothetical repeated sampling but
there are advantages to an interpretation that
uses a single random sample. Contemporary
examples are given that indicate probabili-
ties for random phenomena are interpreted as
classical probabilities, and this interpretation
is applied to statistical inference using urn
models. Both classical and limiting relative
frequency interpretations can be used to com-
municate statistical inference, and the effec-
tiveness of each is discussed. Recent descrip-
tions of p-values, confidence intervals, and
power are viewed through the lens of classical
probability based on a single random sample
from the population. Keywords: classical
probability, statistical ensemble, multiset, p-
value, confidence interval.
∗vosp@ecu.edu
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1 Introduction
Frequentist inference appears to require hy-
pothetical repeated sampling. Cox (2006,
page 8) describes frequentist inference as fol-
lows
Arguments involving probability
only via its (hypothetical) long-run
frequency interpretation are called
frequentist. That is, we define pro-
cedures for assessing evidence that
are calibrated by how they would
perform were they used repeatedly.
In that sense they do not differ from
other measuring instruments.
The entry “Frequency Interpretation in Prob-
ability and Statistical Inference” in the En-
cyclopedia of Statistical Sciences (ESS) also
restricts the interpretation to repeated trials.
. . . ordinary people ... [and] many
professional people, both statisti-
cians and physicists, ... will confine
themselves to probabilities only in
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connection with hypothetically re-
peated trials. (Sverdrup, 2006)
Without proper context these quotes could
misrepresent these authors as only concerned
with long-run behavior. Cox (2006) recog-
nizes the importance of interpreting specific
data.
We intend, of course, that this long-
run behavior is some assurance that
with our particular data currently
under analysis sound conclusions
are drawn. This raises important is-
sues of ensuring, as far as is feasible,
the relevance of the long run to the
specific instance.
We contend that results from a particular
study can be more effectively described by
allowing for a more flexible probability inter-
pretation, one allowing probability to be in-
terpreted as a limiting relative frequency or
as a simple proportion.
Interpreting probabilities as proportions is
the classical interpretation but has been dis-
missed because it is viewed as having lim-
ited utility. The entry “Foundations of Prob-
ability” in the Encyclopedia of Biostatistics
states
Though influential in the early de-
velopment of the subject, and still
valuable in calculations, the classi-
cal view fails because it is seldom
applicable. (Lindley, 2005)
In fact, for understanding p-values, in par-
ticular, and statistical inference, in general,
the classical view is often applicable. Prob-
abilities viewed as proportions fit naturally
in the context of statistical inference. In-
troductory texts use ’frequency’ and ’relative
frequency’ interchangeably with ’count’ and
’proportion’, respectively.1 In a population,
the proportion of individuals having a cer-
tain characteristic provides the same numeri-
cal value as the probability that a single ran-
domly chosen individual will have that char-
acteristic.
Requiring that frequentist inference in-
clude repeated trials is unnecessary in all,
or nearly all, situations. Interpreting prob-
abilities simply as proportions will allow fre-
quentists to better communicate p-values and
other inferential concepts. Furthermore, the
classical interpretation protects against the
issue raised by Cox that long-run behavior
may not be relevant to a specific instance.
2 Common Understand-
ing of Probability
To effectively communicate the p-value and
statistical inference in general we should
know how the term probability, when describ-
ing a random phenomenon, is understood by
the general public. Examples from statistical
literature that interpret probability can seem
contrived and do not represent what we ob-
serve when considering real world examples.
1See, for example, Johnson (1996) pages 22 and
23.
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2.1 ESS Example
The following example appears in the afore-
mentioned ESS entry.
A convict with a death sentence
hanging over his head may have a
chance of being pardoned. He is to
make a choice between white and
black and then draw a ball ran-
domly from an urn containing 999
white balls and 1 black ball. If the
color agrees with his choice he will
be pardoned.
Instead of using the proportion of white balls
in the urn to describe a single random se-
lection, the convict considers an unspecified
number of hypothetical drawings.
The convict replies that he will
choose white because . . . out of
many hypothetical drawings he will
in 99.9% of the trials be pardoned
and in 0.1% of the trials be exe-
cuted. . . . the convict . . . attaches
99.9% probability to the single trial
about to be performed.
The article says the convict can attach a
probability to a single trial because that
probability is a very real thing to
the convict and it is reliably esti-
mated from past experiences con-
cerning urn drawings.
It would seem we need to add the condition
that the convict has sufficient experience with
urn drawings.
Even if that were true, we would expect he
would be open to the equally likely interpre-
tation that clearly applies to a random draw
from an urn. There is no need for a history of
“past experiences concerning urn drawings”
or a hypothetical future where convicts are
executed repeatedly.
2.2 Gambling Examples
The broadcast of the 2018 Final Table in the
49th No-limit Hold-em main event held in Las
Vegas (aired 13 July 2018 on ESPN’s World
Series of Poker) listed the player Cada as hav-
ing a 14% chance of winning while his oppo-
nent Miles had an 86% chance. These proba-
bilities were based on two cards held by Cada,
two held by Miles, and four cards on the ta-
ble. These cards were dealt after the deck was
thoroughly shuffled so that each ordering of
the 52 cards was equally likely, or, at least
treated as such. There is one more card to
be dealt and the announcer says that Cada
has 6 outs – cards that would provide him
with a better hand than Miles. There are 44
cards remaining so the chance that Cada wins
is 6/44 =14%.
North Carolina, like many states, has a lot-
tery where numbers are selected by having
balls jumbled with shots of air in a confined
transparent space. The Pick-3 game con-
sists of three clear boxes each with 10 balls
that are labeled with the numerals 0, 1, ...,
9. These balls are jumbled for a few seconds
and then one is allowed to come to the top.
The jumbling is vigorous enough so that each
ball is assumed to be equally likely to come
up. While there may have been some players
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who waited for there to be sufficient history
of Pick-3 drawings before placing a bet, we
are confident there are many who did not re-
quire such history and still understood the
probability of winning.
2.3 Clinical Trial Example
The examples above each had a known sam-
ple space of equally likely outcomes and this
allowed for the calculation of the proportion
that provided, under suitable randomization,
the interpretation for probability. For statis-
tical inference, simple random sampling from
the population provides equally likely out-
comes so that these probabilities can also be
interpreted as proportions. However, unlike
the previous examples, not all population val-
ues are known so that proportions cannot
be calculated without specifying a model for
these values.
Consider a trial of 60 participants in which
30 are assigned randomly to treatment A and
the remainder to treatment B. For simplicity
we take the response variable to be dichoto-
mous with values favorable and unfavorable.
The population is the 60 participants and the
value for each participant is the ordered pair
indicating the outcome, favorable or unfavor-
able, under treatment A and under treatment
B. Only one value of each pair is observed.
Suppose the number responding favorably to
A is 25 and to B is 17.
One way to compare the treatments is by
testing the hypothesis that the two treat-
ments have the same effect on each partici-
pant; that is, that the values are identical in
each of the 60 outcome pairs. Under this hy-
pothesis there would be exactly 42 favorable
responses regardless of the treatment assign-
ment. The population values consist of 42
favorable and 18 unfavorable outcomes. By
chance 25 of the 42 favorable outcomes were
assigned to treatment A. Each possible as-
signment of 30 outcomes to A can be enu-
merated and the proportion where 25 or more
are favorable can be calculated. This propor-
tion is 0.0235. Likewise, the proportion of
25 or more favorable responses in group B is
also 0.0235. The interpretation is as follows:
4.7% of all possible treatment assignments
have a discrepancy between groups as great
or greater than the observed discrepancy of
25 versus 17. Because the actual assignment
was done in a manner such that each possible
assignment was equally likely, this proportion
is the probability of an observation as extreme
or more extreme than 25 vs 17. That is, the p-
value is 0.047 and its interpretation does not
require that we consider hypothetical random
assignments of subjects to treatments.
3 Relationship between
the Interpretations
The limiting relative frequency interpretation
and the classical interpretation each describe
the same numerical probability. It is not a
question of which is correct. Both are cor-
rect and both are available for describing sta-
tistical inferences. The pertinent question is
which is more useful and the answer involves
two factors. Before considering these factors
we make a distinction between the definition
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of probability and an interpretation thereof.
3.1 One Definition, Two Inter-
pretations
There generally is wider agreement on how
a p-value is calculated, its operational defini-
tion, than its interpretation. There are many
incorrect descriptions of the p-value but this
does not mean there is only one correct way
to interpret its meaning.2
The definition of, and confusion surround-
ing, frequentist inference involves interpreta-
tions of probability, not its definition. Prob-
ability is defined axiomatically as a set func-
tion whose domain consists of subsets from a
set S, the sample space. When the sample
space is finite the domain can be the power
set of S. When the sample space is infi-
nite the power set is replaced with a sigma
field. The common interpretation for the in-
finite case involves extending the finite sam-
ple space interpretation using limits, in par-
ticular limiting relative frequencies. Another
approach is to approximate an infinite model
with one having a finite sample space thereby
allowing probability to be interpreted as a
proportion. We follow the latter approach
here.
Epistemologically, what we call an inter-
pretation could be considered a definition,
but our concerns here are more practical
than philosophical. The equally likely defi-
nition/interpretation is not intended to cover
every situation where one might use the term
2See Greenland et al. (2016) for a useful account-
ing of misinterpretations.
probability, but it is useful for much of sta-
tistical inference. Furthermore, the variety of
settings for statistical inference means proper
interpretation is more easily conveyed when
the term probability is not restricted to only
one interpretation. We categorize these set-
tings using two dichotomous factors: scope
and focus.
3.2 Scope - Specific or Generic
The utility of each interpretation will depend
on the intended audience. In the poker exam-
ple, if the audience is Cada, the player hold-
ing a specific hand, probability is more use-
fully described as was done on the broadcast,
as a proportion of equally likely cards. More
generally, for casino gambling, if the audience
is the house then probability is usefully de-
scribed as a limiting relative frequency that
describes an unspecified, but very large, num-
ber of hands.
The Lottery example did not include an
interpretation of probability. However, if the
audience is a ticket holder, then clearly there
is interest in a specific drawing and the prob-
ability is naturally described as a proportion.
On the other hand, the Lottery Commission
is more concerned with on-going drawings
and so long-run frequencies are natural for
this audience.
In the ESS example, where the audience is
the convict, the proportion of white balls and
the notion of equally likely provide a simpler
description than hypothetical repeated draw-
ings that involve this or other convicts. The
collection of future draws and consequent ex-
ecutions would be relevant to the state.
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For the investigators of the clinical trial or
anyone interested in the particular outcome
of the study, the proportion of randomiza-
tions resulting in a discrepancy as great as
25 and 17 provides a simple interpretation
for the p-value. For statisticians interested
in calibrating how inference procedures such
as Fisher’s exact test “would perform were
they used repeatedly” then significance lev-
els would be specified and probabilities would
be described in terms of limiting relative fre-
quencies of hypothetical repeated randomiza-
tions.
The common factor in comparing the po-
tential audience in each of these examples is
the scope, either specific or generic, to which
the probability extends. For a specific out-
come, be it a hand of cards that could deter-
mine whether a player continues in the tour-
nament, a lottery draw for a ticket holder, a
convict whose life depends on a single draw
from an urn, or a physician wanting to assess
the evidence from a single study for the mer-
its of a specific treatment, a proportion pro-
vides the natural interpretation for the prob-
ability related to a single randomization.
The scope is generic when a specific out-
come is viewed as part of a collection and
probability describes this collection. For
statisticians who are concerned with how
their methods perform in general, it is natural
for the scope to be generic. However, results
from a specific study will be communicated
more effectively when statisticians recognize
that the scope is specific for their audience.
Scope is related to Cox’s distinction be-
tween “long-run behavior” and a “specific in-
stance” but differs in that the collection of
outcomes when the scope is generic need not
be constructed in the long-run. An inter-
pretation for the confidence interval having
generic scope is given below that does not re-
quire repeated sampling.
3.3 Focus - Population or
Model
Scope applies to the interpretation of random
phenomena whether or not these are used for
inference. Focus is meaningful only in the
context of statistical inference where we are
concerned with an unknown distribution of
numerical values. We call this distribution,
whether it be measurements on individuals
in a population or values obtained from ran-
dom phenomena, the population distribution,
or simply the population when the context
makes it clear that we are considering a dis-
tribution of numerical values rather than a
collection of individuals.
Statistical inference proceeds by positing
that a known distribution, the model, is the
same as, or an approximation to, the un-
known population distribution. While statis-
tical inference is always concerned with the
population distribution, some inference pro-
cedures address the population directly and
others indirectly using one or more models
for the population. That is, the focus of an
inference procedure can be on the population
or a model.
The probability calculated for the clini-
cal trial is a p-value and the calculation of
any p-value requires the specification of a
model (determined by the null hypothesis
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along with other assumptions). Unless the
population is the same as the model, it is
difficult to interpret the p-value as directly
describing the population.
On the other hand, probability used to de-
scribe confidence intervals can have as its fo-
cus either the population or a family of mod-
els for the population. For the former, the in-
terpretation of a 95% confidence interval for
the mean, say .03 to 41.83, is that this inter-
val was the result of an interval generating
procedure applied to the population that has
the property that 95% of the intervals from
this procedure contain the population mean.
Since 95% describes the procedure and not
the specific interval, the scope of this inter-
pretation is generic and the focus is the pop-
ulation.
Fisher (1949, pages 190-191) provides the
following interpretation.
An alternative view of the matter
is to consider that variation of the
unknown parameter, µ, generates
a continuum of hypotheses each of
which might be regarded as a null
hypothesis, which the experiment
is capable of testing. In this case
the data of the experiment, and
the test of significance based upon
them, have divided this continuum
into two portions. One, a region in
which µ lies between the limits 0.03
and 41.83, is accepted by the test
of significance, in the sense that the
values of µ within this region are
not contradicted by the data, at the
level of significance chosen. The re-
mainder of the continuum, includ-
ing all values of µ outside these lim-
its, is rejected by the test of signifi-
cance.
Here the focus is on a collection of models.
The scope is specific because each model is
assessed in terms of how extreme the specific
data would be for that model.
Simply checking whether a parameter value
is in the interval shortchanges the inferential
value of the confidence interval. The end-
points serve as guideposts indicating which
models are such that the data would be un-
likely enough to elicit doubt regarding the
model. For models having mean slightly less
than 0.03 the p-value is slightly less than 0.05
and for models having mean slightly greater
than 0.03 the p-value is slightly greater than
0.05. Similar comments hold for models with
means near 41.83.
4 Urn Models
Urn models are a conceptual construction
that provide a convenient tool for describing
inferential results in terms of classical proba-
bility. One should conceive of a bowl filled
with N balls that are indistinguishable in
regard to their possible selection but com-
pletely distinguishable in terms of at least
one feature. This distinguishable feature is
needed to count the balls. The urn model
is an example of a multiset which is like
a set except multiplicities are allowed. For
sets, {1, 2}∪ {2, 3} = {1, 2, 3} while for urns,
⌊1, 2⌋∪⌊2, 3⌋ = ⌊1, 2, 2, 3⌋. Unions and other
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basic set operations used below also hold for
multisets.
4.1 Population Urn
A population can be described using the con-
ceptional construction of an urn model. This
model may be thought of as a bowl that con-
tains one ball for each member in the pop-
ulation. For a variable of interest X , the
population urn ⌊X⌋pop is the bowl where the
numerical value for each member is written
on the corresponding ball. In most cases the
values on the balls and the number of balls
N are unknown. From the population urn
we construct another urn ⌊X⌋npop containing(
N
n
)
balls. Each sample of n balls taken from
⌊X⌋pop is represented by one ball in ⌊X⌋
n
pop;
this ball is labeled with an n-tuple of values
obtained from the balls of the corresponding
sample from ⌊X⌋pop. The only restriction on
n is that it is a positive integer not greater
than N . Notationally, this conceptual con-
struction is
⌊X⌋pop
Cn−→ ⌊X⌋npop
where the arrow indicates an enumeration of
all possible samples of n balls so that the ob-
served sample corresponds to a ball (x)obs in
⌊X⌋npop.
3
4.2 Model Urns
For inference regarding the population, a
model is posited for ⌊X⌋pop and the urn for
3Sampling plans other than SRS would require a
different enumeration.
the model is written ⌊X⌋θ because often there
will be a set of models indexed by a parameter
θ ∈ Θ. To assess how well ⌊X⌋θ approximates
⌊X⌋pop, the observed sample (x)
obs is com-
pared to the possible samples in the model,
⌊X⌋nθ , where
⌊X⌋θ
Cn−→ ⌊X⌋nθ . (1)
Unlike ⌊X⌋npop, the n-tuples on all balls in
⌊X⌋nθ are known.
4
The samples in ⌊X⌋nθ are compared to the
observed sample using a test statistic Tθ, a
real valued function on Rn. The value of the
observed test statistic is tobsθ = Tθ (x)
obs. The
plausibility of a specific model ⌊X⌋θo as an
approximation to ⌊X⌋pop is assessed by com-
paring (x)obs to the samples in ⌊X⌋nθ . Specifi-
cally, by finding the proportion of balls whose
test statistic value is greater than or equal to
tobsθo . This proportion is written as
Pr⌊Tθo ≥ t
obs
θo
⌋nθo (2)
where
Pr⌊T ≥ t⌋nθ =
| {b ∈ ⌊X⌋nθ : T (b) ≥ t} |
|⌊X⌋nθ |
. (3)
No randomizations were used to construct the
model urn ⌊X⌋nθo . However, for the propor-
tion in (2) to be meaningful as a probabil-
ity, the observed sample must have been ob-
tained using a simple random sample (SRS)
from the population. Given this randomiza-
tion, the proportion in (2) is the p-value for
testing H : θ = θo using the test statistic Tθo .
4The number of balls in model urn ⌊X⌋θ need not
equal the number in the population urn. The relevant
features are proportions rather than counts.
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The (1−α)100% confidence interval5 for θ
obtained from (x)obs is found by allowing θo
in (2) to range over all possible values for θ,
Cα
(x)obs
=
{
θ : Pr⌊Tθ ≥ t
obs
θ ⌋
n
θ ≥ α
}
. (4)
The interval in (4) represents all the models,
indexed by θ, for which the observed data
would not be in the most extreme α100% ob-
servations as measured by the ordering of the
test statistic Tθ. Even though the confidence
interval Cα
(x)obs
involves many models there is
still only one randomization that is required
– the randomization used to obtain the data
from the population.
The procedural interpretation of the confi-
dence interval can be described using an urn
of confidence intervals
⌊X⌋npop ←→ ⌊C
α⌋npop (5)
where the urn on the right is obtained by let-
ting (x)obs in (4) range over all possible sam-
ples in the population.
4.3 Compared to Repeated
Sampling
The sampling urns for the population and for
models are constructed using enumeration.
In contrast, the limiting relative frequency
interpretation involves the conceptual con-
struction of an infinite sequence where each
term in the sequence is obtained by a hypo-
thetical random sample. Notationally,
⌊X⌋pop
SRSn−→ (x)1, (x)2, . . . (6)
5This notation and interpretation allow generaliz-
ing to a confidence region.
where (x)i is the n-tuple obtained from the
ith hypothetical sample. Because these are
random samples, another sequence
⌊X⌋pop
SRSn−→ (x)′1, (x)
′
2, . . . (7)
could be used. The sequences in (6) and (7)
are different but have the same limiting rela-
tive frequency.
The structure in random sampling that al-
lows the calculation of probabilities is rep-
resented in the limit of an infinite sequence
whose order is immaterial to describing this
structure. In contrast, the enumeration used
to construct ⌊X⌋npop imposes no artificial or-
dering and describes the structure without in-
finite limits.
For models, limiting relative frequency
could be described using a conceptual con-
struction where ⌊X⌋pop is replaced with ⌊X⌋θ
in (6). While actual random samples from a
model can be useful for calculations, hypo-
thetical random samples are not required for
interpretation since all samples are known.
Furthermore, when hypothetical randomiza-
tions are used to interpret model probabili-
ties, probabilities that are independent of the
data, these can be confused with hypotheti-
cal randomizations from the population that
are intimately connected with the data. 6
Random variables are used to model data
and, if Xrv is a random variable
7, then the
terminology suggests thinking of Xrv as gen-
erating a sequence of values through repeated
randomization
6Section 6 provides an example.
7Common notation would be X but we are using
X to represent a finite collection of values.
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Xrv
SRSn−→ (x)1, (x)2, . . . . (8)
We use the notation ⌊·⌋ to emphasize that the
model is an aggregate of values rather than
a generator of infinite random sequences.
When the aggregate is finite, the distribution
of ⌊X⌋θ is described by proportions having in-
teger denominator. When the aggregate is in-
finite, the distribution of ⌊Xrv⌋θ is described
by the proportion of areas under a curve.8
Neither the definition nor interpretation of
a probability model requires randomization.
Both the definition and interpretation of fre-
quentist inference require randomization but
this need not be imagined as belonging to
a hypothetical repetition of randomizations.
The randomization required is the one that
produced the data that were obtained
⌊X⌋pop
SRSn−→ (x)obs.
To recognize the importance of this random-
ization from the population, models are de-
scribed using (1) rather than (8).
5 Confidence Intervals
The Fisher interpretation for the observed in-
terval is naturally described without repeated
sampling using Cα
(x)obs
. The interpretation of
a confidence interval as having been produced
by a procedure is typically described using
repeated sampling. Section 5.1 shows that,
in fact, a single random sample can be used
8If Xrv is continuous the curve is the probability
density function. If Xrv is discrete the proportion of
lengths would described the distribution.
for the procedural interpretation. Section 5.2
compares the single random sample interpre-
tations of Cα
(x)obs
and ⌊Cα⌋npop.
5.1 ⌊Cα⌋npop
Greenland et al. (2016) provide the following
interpretation for the 95% confidence inter-
val,
. . . the 95% refers only to how
often 95% confidence intervals com-
puted from very many studies would
contain the true effect if all the as-
sumptions used to compute the in-
tervals were correct.
It seems the word “only” is used to discourage
other procedural interpretations since earlier
in their paper the observed confidence inter-
val is described in terms of testing which we
understand to be Fisher’s interpretation.
Even if the word “only” applies just to the
procedural interpretation, this statement is
too strong. As the urn models show, this in-
terpretation need not be described in terms of
limiting relative frequency. When the family
of models contains the true model, ⌊X⌋pop =
⌊X⌋θ∗ for some θ
∗, then the urn ⌊C .05⌋npop de-
fined by (5) has the property that 95% of
these intervals contain the true effect, θ∗. The
proportion 0.95 is a probability when each in-
terval in ⌊C .05⌋npop is given an equally likely
chance of being selected; i.e., the observed
data were obtained by an SRS from the popu-
lation. The procedural interpretation for the
confidence interval does not require the pro-
cedure to be repeated many times, just as
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understanding Cada’s probability of winning
did not require repeatedly shuffling the re-
maining poker cards.
This requirement of conceptualizing very
many studies leads to an unnecessary criti-
cism of a common (mis)interpretation regard-
ing an observed confidence interval:
There is a 95% chance that the
population mean is between 0.03
and 41.83.
A standard response is “Either the mean is
between these values or it is not. The values
0.03, 41.83, and the population are not ran-
dom so probability is not meaningful here.”9
This statement warrants caution rather
than correction. To understand how this can
be a reasonable interpretation we consider a
version of the North Carolina Pick-3 Lottery
where a Statistics professor buys 1,000 Pick-3
tickets, one for each possible combination of
three digits from 000 to 999. The tickets are
partitioned so that 20 tickets are placed into
each of 50 envelopes that are labeled with the
names of the 50 students in her class. The
drawing is on Wednesday and at Tuesday’s
lecture the professor asks Bob what is the
probability that his envelope has the winning
ticket. Bob responds 1 in 50. The professor
will distribute the envelopes at Thursday’s
lecture.
Before distributing the envelopes on Thurs-
day, Bob is asked the same question and again
gives the probability of 1 in 50. Should the
professor correct Bob and say that either he
9For a recent version of this response see Anderson
(2019).
has or has not won, and that probability no
longer applies? We think not. It is still mean-
ingful to say the probability for each student
is 1 in 50.
However, the situation on Tuesday is differ-
ent from that on Thursday, and recognizing
this difference indicates the necessary cau-
tion. On Thursday when the first envelope is
opened the probability of the remaining en-
velopes changes to 1 in 49 or to 0. If the en-
velopes had been distributed before the draw-
ing, any envelope could be opened and the
probability would remain 1 in 50.
The interpretation “There is a 95% chance
that the population mean is between 0.03
and 41.83” is incorrect when there is addi-
tional information from the population (i.e.,
opened envelopes). In particular, this inter-
pretation cannot be used when there are two
observed confidence intervals from the same
population – let alone, “very many studies”
as the above repeated sampling interpreta-
tion requires. However, without additional
information from the population this state-
ment provides a reasonable description of the
information in the data concerning the popu-
lation mean. Cox and Hinkley (1979, pages
227-228) also consider interpreting the ob-
served interval in terms of probability rea-
sonable given appropriate cautions.
5.2 Complementary Interpre-
tations
In terms of scope and focus the interpreta-
tions represented by Cα
(x)obs
and ⌊Cα⌋npop are
very different. The interval Cα
(x)obs
is specific
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to the data that was observed and the focus
is on a collection of models. The collection of
intervals ⌊Cα⌋npop is generic and the focus is
on the population.
The interpretations also differ in the as-
sumptions that are required. The urn
⌊Cα⌋npop cannot be constructed directly since
the population is unknown but relies on the
assumption that there is a model with pa-
rameter θ∗ such that ⌊X⌋θ∗ is a close approx-
imation to ⌊X⌋pop. This assumption is not
required for the interpretation represented by
Cα
(x)obs
.
Coverage probability and expected length
apply to ⌊Cα⌋npop but not to C
α
(x)obs
. When
intervals are defined with these two criteria
in mind but without inverting a test, there
is great flexibility in how individual intervals
are chosen. As a result, observed intervals
can have poor properties when interpreted
in terms of testing.10 To maintain fidelity
to the Fisher interpretation, Vos and Hudson
(2005) introduce the criteria p-confidence and
p-bias that apply to Cα
(x)obs
.
6 P -values
Confidence intervals allow for an interpreta-
tion that is population focused. Interpret-
ing p-values in terms of population focus can
lead to problems. As an example we consider
the issue of potential comparisons raised by
Gelman (2016) who claims
10This issue arises when the sample space is dis-
crete and the intervals are considered too conserva-
tive in terms of coverage probability. See, for exam-
ple, Vos and Hudson (2008).
. . . to compute a valid p-value you
need to know what analyses would
have been done had the data been
different. Even if the researchers
only did a single analysis of the data
at hand, they well could’ve done
other analyses had the data been
different.
We cannot be certain of Gelman’s inter-
pretation for the p-value but the proportion
in (2) is a valid p-value and requires only
a single random sample. Gelman considers
repeated sampling from the population but
the p-value is a probability that describes a
model, not the population. Comments by
Fisher (1959, page 44) apply here
In general tests of significance
are based on hypothetical probabil-
ities calculated from the null hy-
potheses. They do not generally
lead to any probability statements
about the real world, but to a ra-
tional and well-defined measure of
reluctance to the acceptance of the
hypotheses they test.
Certainly p-values can be misused but Gel-
man’s statement is too strong because it
makes p-values invalid even when there has
been no actual misuse. A potential misuse
of a p-value, or any inference procedure, does
not invalidate a single instance of proper use.
Consider the following example from Texas
Hold’em Poker. A gambler calculates the
probability of making a specific hand based
on the proportion of unseen cards. This cal-
culation is done under the following condi-
tions: he is well rested, sober, and knows the
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dealer, and he has no reason to suspect cheat-
ing. The result of this calculation is a valid
probability. The gambler’s wife might say
that if he were to play too much poker, then
he would become sleepy, drink too much, and
gamble at shady establishments. Regarding
the long run outcome of his gambling, these
are legitimate concerns that bring the valid-
ity (utility) of future probability calculations
into questions. However, these potentialities
do not affect the gambler’s specific calcula-
tion made under the actual conditions. The
scope for the gambler is specific while for his
wife it is generic.
The reader might find differences between
our example and the discussion of potential
comparisons. Our hope is that we could agree
that hypothetical long run sampling is prob-
lematic when used to address a specific in-
stance, and our point is that repeated sam-
pling is not required to interpret inference for
the data actually observed.
7 Power
We have seen that confidence intervals and
p-values can be interpreted using a sin-
gle random sample. Power calculations are
done before data have been collected and
do not require any randomization or hypo-
thetical repetitions. This is in contrast to
how power is often discussed. For example,
Greenland et al. (2016) describe power as a
probability “defined over repetitions of the
same study design and so is a frequency prob-
ability.”
Power calculations are done by comparing
the model specified by a null hypothesis to a
competing model. The urn ⌊X⌋no of the null
model is compared to the urn ⌊X⌋n1 of the
competing model in terms of a test statistic
To. Specifically, the significance level α de-
fines a value t∗ such that
Pr⌊To ≥ t
∗⌋no = α
and the power β is given by
Pr⌊To ≥ t
∗⌋n1 = β.
Both α and β are proportions. The power
is the proportion of all samples of size n from
the competing model (posited as an approxi-
mation to the population) that are more ex-
treme than t∗. Power calculations based on
random variables are conducted in the same
way but now proportions with integer de-
nominator are generalized to proportions of
area or a more general measure. These pro-
portions are meaningful as probabilities and
useful for inference regarding the population
when the observed data is obtained by an ac-
tual randomization from the population. Hy-
pothetical repetitions from the population or
one of the models are not required.
8 Discussion
Describing the observed confidence interval
as having been obtained from a procedure
is often the only interpretation that is con-
sidered, but there are authors who recog-
nize Fisher’s interpretation. Examples in-
clude, Kempthorne and Folks (1971) who call
Fisher’s interpretation a consonance interval
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and Mayo (2018) who describes inference in
terms of severe testing that appears to be
very close to Fisher’s interpretation.
Other authors also see pitfalls with the in-
troduction of the concept of infinity. For ex-
ample, Hacking (1976, p. 7) “However much
they have been a help, I shall argue that
hypothetical infinite populations only hinder
full understanding of the very property von
Mises and Fisher did so much to elucidate.”
We have restricted urns to be finite for sim-
plicity. Allowing an urn to have an infinite
number of balls results in a statistical ensem-
ble. According to the Wikipedia entry (2019)
... an ensemble (also statistical
ensemble) is an idealization con-
sisting of a large number of virtual
copies (sometimes infinitely many)
of a system, considered all at once,
each of which represents a possible
state that the real system might be
in.
A single simple random sample of n individu-
als from a population creates a statistical en-
semble where the possible states consist ex-
actly of the possible samples of size n from
the population.
The conceptualization of a statistical en-
semble differs from repeated sampling in that
a large number is considered all at once
and this idea avoids several pitfalls associ-
ated with repeated sampling. Repeated sam-
pling and terms such as “long run” intro-
duce the notion of time even though time
is not included in the definition of probabil-
ity. Adding to the confusion is that when the
scope is generic, such as a statistician defin-
ing procedures in terms of “how they would
perform were they used repeatedly”, time fits
naturally in that particular interpretation.
Furthermore, repetition generates a sequence
and the order of this sequence has nothing to
do with the structure of the collection so the
idea of independence is needed to appropri-
ately describe a random sequence. By con-
sidering the collection all at once, whether it
is balls in an urn or states of an ensemble,
these complications are avoided. A statisti-
cal ensemble can be applied when the scope
is generic or specific but is especially useful
in the latter case.
Recognizing that the focus can be either
the population or the model sheds light on
the role of randomization in statistical infer-
ence. Randomly selecting data from a pop-
ulation is fundamental for making inferences
about the population, and models are used
to make inferences, but no randomizations
from the model are required. Hypothetical
repeated randomizations may be introduced
as a means to interpret the probability ob-
tained from the model, but these hypotheti-
cal randomizations, and the consequent con-
fusion with the required randomization from
the population, can be avoided by using urn
models or statistical ensembles.
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